Using a panel of mandatory SEC disclosure filings we test the predictability of investment fraud. We find that past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring, are significantly associated with future fraud. Avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest fraud risk allows investors to avoid 29.7% of investment frauds, and over half of the total dollar losses from fraud. Even after excluding small frauds and fraud by rogue employees, we are able to predict at least 24.1% of frauds at a false positive rate of 5%. There is no evidence that investors are compensated for fraud risk through superior performance or lower fees. We also find that investors react strongly to the discovery of fraud, resulting in significantly higher rates of firm death and investor outflows. Our results provide investors and regulators with tools for predicting investment fraud.
This law requires investment advisors to file Form ADV, which contains information on specific conflicts of interest, regulatory violations, and criminal charges. Using the information in these filings, we address an important policy issue that has arisen in the wake of the Madoff and Stanford frauds: Do the mandatory disclosures in Form ADV allow investors to predict fraud?
To address this question, we hand collect detailed information on all SEC enforcement actions over the period 2001 through 2009, and identify all frauds that harm investment management clients.
6 Included in our data is the type of fraud, the size of investors' losses, the time-span of the fraud, and the detection date. We combine the fraud data with a panel Using the Form ADV data to predict fraud, we show that disclosures related to past regulatory violations, conflicts of interest, and external monitoring all significantly predict fraud. Using only this easily obtainable information, avoiding firms with the 5% highest ex ante fraud risk allows an investor to avoid 29.7% of frauds. We also show that our model is successful at predicting large frauds. Avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest fraud risk allows an investor to avoid more than half of the total dollar losses from fraud. The results are qualitatively similar regardless of whether the dependent variable is an indicator variable for fraud, or the proportion of investor assets lost in the fraud. Anecdotally, our model also fares well. Both Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and Stanford Capital Management filed Form ADVs prior to being charged with fraud. Both firms' estimated fraud risks were above the 95 ℎ percentile of all firms in our sample.
Our study also examines the considerable heterogeneity among frauds to ensure we are predicting the most economically important cases. For example, investor losses are much higher in Ponzi schemes than when a firm misrepresents asset values to collect inflated fees.
Similarly, fraud by a rogue employee is generally less damaging than fraud orchestrated by the executives of a firm. To ensure our results are not driven by frauds involving overcharging of fees or rogue employees, we test the predictability of different types of fraud. While frauds involving theft are relatively more difficult to predict, avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest fraud risk allows an investor to avoid 25.5% of thefts. We find similar results for firm-wide frauds (as opposed to fraud by rogue employees).
Given that fraud is predictable, a natural question is: why do investors allocate money to these firms? One possibility is that investors are compensated for fraud risk through superior performance or lower fees. To test this, we merge our firm level data with the TASS hedge fund, CRSP mutual fund, and PSN institutional fund databases. In all three samples of funds, we find no evidence that investors are compensated for fraud risk. Given the absence of offsetting benefits, the clear implication of our results is that investors should avoid firms with high fraud risk.
To test how investors view different types of fraud, we examine investors' reactions to the disclosure of fraud. We find that the revelation of fraud is strongly associated with firm death, particularly when losses from fraud are a large proportion of firm assets under management. Investor reactions are stronger when the fraud involves theft, or when the fraud is firm-wide rather than the work of a rogue employee. These findings support our argument that certain types of fraud are more economically meaningful to investors.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to test the ex ante predictability of investment fraud using required SEC disclosures. Our results provide insights into the relation of fraud with common organizational structures and conflicts of interest in the asset management industry. Investors can use our findings to avoid investment advisors with a high probability of fraud, and federal regulators will benefit from the ability to focus on firms with high fraud risk.
Related Research
Our paper contributes to the literature on predicting fraud by investment managers. To our knowledge, Bollen and Pool (2010) and Zitzewitz (2006) are the only other papers to test whether investment manager fraud can be identified detected using publicly available data.
Bollen and Pool (2010) build on several earlier studies which test if hedge funds manipulate reported returns (e.g. Bollen and Pool (2008) , Bollen and Pool (2009) , and Straumann (2008)). Bollen and Pool (2010) find that suspicious return patterns are associated with a higher probability of future fraud charges. Zitzewitz (2006) shows it was possible to identify mutual fund late trading using daily flow data. While similar in spirit to our paper, these studies use price and volume data, rather than firm characteristics. An advantage of using firm characteristics, is that we are able to predict fraud prior to its initiation, while methods based on returns and volume are only able to detect ongoing fraud. Schwarz (2008, 2009 ) examine the topic of operational risk using a cross-section of hedge fund management firms' Form ADV filings. They define "problem" funds as those managed by a firm that reports any prior legal or regulatory violations committed by either the firm itself or any affiliated firm (affiliated firms are defined as those under common control). Brown et al. then test whether current firm characteristics are associated with past problems. Because historical Form ADV data is not publicly available, the authors create a measure of operational risk based on the correlation between Form ADV data and historically available hedge fund data. They then test if this measure is associated with hedge fund death, flows, and returns.
Although we also use Form ADV data, our work differs significantly from Schwarz (2008, 2009) 
Data

Investment Fraud
We combine two data sources in this study: 1) data on investment fraud, and 2) investment advisor characteristics disclosed in Form ADV. To obtain data on investment frauds, we hand collect information on all SEC regulatory actions, civil lawsuits, and criminal charges 10 against investment advisors from 2001 through 2009. Even when the fraud is detected by an agency other than the SEC, the SEC will launch an administrative action which we observe.
We include fraud cases only if the fraud directly harms the firm's investment clients. We do not include insider trading, short sales violations, crimes by the brokerage division of the firm, or other activities, unless they cause direct losses to the firms' investment clients.
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Many fraud cases occur over several years and are associated with multiple legal actions.
For example, Figure 1 shows the time line of one fraud in our sample, which was initiated in 14 For example, all frauds classified as Ponzi schemes also involve the misrepresentation of failing to disclose to clients that the firm is running a Ponzi scheme. However, because the Ponzi scheme is far more serious, these frauds are classified as Ponzi schemes and not Misrepresentation.
15 The Madoff fraud is a good example of the difficulty in determining the exact amount of a fraud. When he was charged, Madoff's investors were told they had $64.8 billion in assets. In total, investors had allocated $36 billion to Madoff, and over time Madoff had paid out approximately $18 billion to investors. In addition to descriptive information on their advisory businesses, Form ADV requires disclosure of a large amount of information with the intent of, among other things, "deterring fraud". 19 As such, many of the variables in Form ADV are required precisely because the SEC believes these variables are likely to predict fraud. The disclosure variables we use in this paper are summarized in Table 2 Panel B. Column one shows pooled averages across all firmyear observations. Column two shows summary statistics for firm-year observations in which there is not an ongoing fraud (clean firms). Column three summarizes firm-year observations in which fraud occurs (fraud firms) and reports the significance of the differences. Custody is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has possession of, or the authority to obtain possession of, clients' assets. Custody makes it much easier for an investment 21 Formally, this variable equals one if the firm answers "Yes" to any of questions 8A1, 8A3, 8B2, or 8B3. We do not include 8A2, as it includes investment advisors investing in their own funds, which does not seem likely to increase the probability of fraud. We do not include 8B1 (if affiliated brokerage executes trades for brokerage clients in securities which are also purchased for investment advisory clients) as it is very highly correlated with the Broker in Firm variable.
22 For a lengthy discussion of soft dollar misuse see "Securities and Exchange Commission, 1998, Inspection Report on the Soft Dollar Practices of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisors, and Mutual Funds: http: //www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm". The report shows that 35% of audited firms illegally used soft dollars, including for: direct cash payments to family members for non-existent research reports, family vacations, home renovations, and most ironically, legal fees. Hedge Funds is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm manages hedge funds.
Slightly over 10% of the firms in our sample manage hedge funds, but only 4.7% of fraud firms manage hedge funds. We include this variable for two reasons. First, hedge funds are relatively opaque which may facilitate fraud. Second, prior to 2006 some hedge fund management firms were able to avoid filing Form ADV. This may create a sample selection bias if non-reporting is higher for fraudulent hedge funds. Mitigating the potential sample selection problem, is the fact that even prior to the 2006 registration requirement, most hedge fund management firms with more than $25 million in assets and at least 15 investors filed Form ADV. Of firms in the TASS database that filed Form ADV following the SEC rule 23 Firms are not directly required to disclose any information regarding auditors in Form ADV. change, 61.7% were registered prior to the rule change and these firms managed 65.2% of aggregate hedge fund assets. The coefficient on hedge fund management is not significantly different in the 2006 cross-section compared with the earlier years, suggesting that there is not a meaningful sample selection bias.
Predicting Fraud
In this section, we test whether firms' disclosure information can accurately predict investment fraud. Our independent variables are taken exclusively from Form ADV, as one of our goals is to test if the disclosure information required by the SEC is useful. Our selection of predictive variables aim to include the characteristics the SEC believes are sufficiently important to justify mandatory disclosure. We group our variables into three main categories: 1) past legal and regulatory violations, 2)conflicts of interest, and 3) monitoring.
The regressions in this section are intended to predict fraud, and we do not make any claims regarding causality. Many of our independent variables are endogenous. Indeed, in many fraud cases the firm's executives deliberately chose organizational structures that enabled fraud. However, since our goal is prediction, rather than establishing causality, the potential endogeneity of our independent variables does not change the interpretation of the results.
A major caveat in interpreting our findings is that only detected frauds enter our sample.
There are three separate factors affecting fraud detection: the unobservable true rate of fraud, the probability fraud is detected given a fixed level of monitoring, and the allocation of monitoring resources. Ideally, we want to predict the true rate of fraud. However, if our predictive variables are correlated with either monitoring or fraud detection this may bias our results. Further, there are two reasons to believe our predictive variables may be correlated with fraud detection and monitoring. First, any characteristic that increases the probability of detection decreases the incentive for fraud. In general, this problem biases against finding significant results, as characteristics associated with a higher rate of fraud will also be associated with a lower detection rate. Second, if the SEC, or other monitors, consider the difficulty of detecting fraud when allocating monitoring resources this may, or may not, be sufficient to outweigh the added difficulty in detecting fraud. These difficulties may cause our empirical results to differ from the actual relation between firm characteristics and the unobservable true rate of fraud.
We address the problem of undetected fraud in two ways. First, although our panel of independent variables ends in 2006, we collect information on all detected frauds through December 2009. Using information from the legal filings we identify when fraud occurred, and our dependent variable is the occurrence of fraud in a given year, even if the fraud is not detected until years later. Second, we test the relation between the fraud prediction variables and the duration of detected frauds.
24 The results, in Appendix Table 1 , show that none of the past violations, conflict of interest, or monitoring variables predict fraud duration. This is suggestive that our results are not driven by the detection rate, as it seems reasonable to assume that if a variable decreased the probability of fraud detection it would be associated with longer fraud duration, conditional on the fraud being detected. Unfortunately, direct tests of the relation between these variables and fraud detection is not possible. It is possible that there are certain types of fraud which are never detected; this would bias our results and fail to be detected by the fraud duration regressions.
Prediction Models
In Table 3 Panel A we estimate a probit model to predict investment fraud using information from Form ADV. In columns 1 through 5, the dependent variable equals one if 24 Only observations where the legal filings clearly indicate the start and end dates of the fraud are included.
a fraud occurs within the next three years. 25 In column 6, the dependent variable equals one if a fraud is initiated during the the next year. All columns include log(Assets Under Management) and log(Firm Age) as controls. Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year.
In the first column of However, there are two additional explanations. First, past regulatory violations increase the probability of an SEC examination which may increase the rate of fraud detection, independent of the true rate of fraud. We view this explanation as unlikely, however, because in Appendix Table 1 we fail to find a relation between fraud duration and past violations. Firms with an economic interest in client transactions are significantly more likely to commit fraud. There is an obvious conflict of interest when the investment manager takes the opposite side of a transaction from their client. Not only does this signal a lack of concern for investors, it provides a mechanism for fraud. For example, Gintel Asset Management defrauded clients through self dealing. Robert Gintel purchased stocks for his own account, and then sold the securities to investors at slightly higher prices on the same day. While each instance of fraud may be small, over time it is possible to expropriate a large amount.
Soft Dollars does not significantly predict fraud. In our sample, we observe numerous cases of investment advisors defrauding clients through soft dollar arrangements. For example, in one case Schultz Asset Management LLC sold research reports to a broker. The broker then provided the research reports to Schultz Asset Management in return for Schultz accepting high commissions on clients' trades. However, the majority of clean firms in the sample accept soft dollars, and many fraudulent firms fail to disclose their use of soft dollars.
As a result, disclosed soft dollar use does not predict fraud.
Firms affiliated with a broker/dealer have significantly higher rates of fraud. Using an inhouse brokerage removes external oversight and creates a mechanism for committing fraud. incentive to commit fraud due to a higher probability of detection. Note that conditional on fraud occurring, monitoring by large investors will increase the probability of detection, which biases against our finding. This suggests that large investors are associated with a lower rate of actual fraud, rather than a lower detection rate. 
The Economic Interpretation of the Prediction Models
The probit regressions in Table 3 Panel A show that Form ADV data has statistically significant power to predict fraud. However, statistical significance does not directly address whether our model would allow investors to avoid losses from fraud. To answer this question, Table 3 Panel B shows the proportion of frauds that can be avoided using the probit results.
Panel C shows the proportion of dollars lost to fraud that can be avoided.
As discussed in Greene (2002, pg. 685) , for infrequent events the standard rule of predicting an event for estimated probabilities above 50% is inappropriate, and in our model would predict that no frauds ever occur. 28 Instead we examine the tradeoffs between correctly predicting fraud and the false positive rate. False positives, which occur when our model incorrectly predicts a clean firm will commit fraud in the next year, can be thought of as the opportunity cost to investors of erroneously limiting their investment opportunity set. While it seems reasonable to think that costs are asymmetric, in that failing to predict fraud is more costly than mistakenly avoiding an honest investment manager, we do not take a strong position on cost asymmetry and instead illustrate the possible tradeoffs.
Each row in Table 3 Panel B shows the percentage of frauds correctly predicted for a fixed false positive rate. The columns in Panel B correspond to the columns in Panel A.
28 The prediction that no frauds ever occur is correct more than 99% of the time. While this is a high success rate, it is not a useful prediction rule as it predicts 0% of frauds.
For example, the full model, in column 5 of Panel A, correctly predicts 29.7% of frauds at a false positive rate of 5.0%. As the false positive rate increases, so does the proportion of frauds predicted. All of the models predict at least 20% of frauds at a false positive rate of 5%. However, the models containing prior regulatory violations and conflicts of interest are significantly better than the models containing monitoring and client type variables.
To complement the results in Table 3 Panel B, we also create a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the full model in Panel A column 5. The points on the ROC curve, shown in Figure 2 , are generated nonparametrically by using each observation's predicted value from the probit model as a cutpoint, and then computing both the proportion of frauds correctly predicted and the false positives. Random prediction of fraud would result in a straight 45 degree line. The area under the ROC curve in Figure 2 is significantly greater than the null hypothesis of no predictive power. Initially, the curve rises steeply, showing that it is possible to avoid a considerable number of frauds at little cost.
In addition to the percentage of frauds which can be avoided, we are interested in the probit models' ability to identify the largest frauds. Table 3 Panel C, shows the percentage of total dollars lost to fraud that can be successfully avoided for each prediction model and false positive rate. For example, the first row of the first column in Panel C shows that avoiding the firms with the 0.5% highest fraud risk, as identified in Panel A column 1, would allow an investor to avoid 16.1% of total dollars lost to fraud. To avoid having extreme outliers drive our results, the dollar losses to fraud are winsorized at the 99 ℎ percentile. For multi-year frauds, we evenly distributed losses across all years in which the fraud occurs.
The results show the probit models allow investors to avoid a large percentage of total dollar losses from fraud, and provide evidence that the results in Panel A are not driven by the smallest frauds. In fact, the results suggest that large frauds are more predictable than small frauds. For the full model, avoiding the firms with the 5% highest fraud risk allows an investor to avoid over half of the total dollar losses from fraud. The results in columns 1 and 2, suggest that prior violations and conflicts of interest are particularily good at predicting large frauds.
As an out-of-sample robustness test, we have gathered information on investment frauds detected during the first quarter of 2010. There were a total of 10 frauds detected during this period that directly harmed investment advisory clients and were committed by registered firms. 29 These frauds were not used to estimate our probit models, and so allow for an out-of-sample test. The estimated fraud risk of the 10 firms charged with fraud in 2010 is significantly greater than average at the 1% level (based on Welch's t-test which controls for difference in sample size and possible unequal variances). Looking at individual firms, three of them have ex ante fraud risk above the 95 ℎ percentile, and seven of the firms' have fraud risk above the 90 ℎ percentile. While this is admittedly a small sample, it provides some evidence that our model makes reasonably robust predictions.
Investor Losses from Fraud
Not all frauds are equal; in some cases investors lose everything, while in others their losses are modest. Predicting catastrophic loss is most important for investors, and so in this section we address the size of losses from fraud. To do this, we estimate a Tobit model where the dependent variable equals investors' losses as a percentage of the firm's assets under management.
The legal filings related to the frauds in our sample usually contain only aggregate investor losses over the duration of the fraud. As a result, for multi-year frauds we do not know the exact losses in specific years. Because we have only a single loss amount per fraud we estimate cross-sectional Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the total dollar losses from fraud, divided by the firm's total assets under management. The independent variables are taken from each firm's first available Form ADV filing. As the independent variables in this model were discussed at length in the prior subsection, for expositional efficiency we discuss only the full model in column 5, and focus on the differences from the corresponding column in Table 3 .
In general, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the probit model results. This provides assurance that the probit model is not simply successful at predicting minor frauds, but misses larger frauds. The statistical significance is higher in this model suggesting characteristics that predict a higher probability of fraud are generally also associated with higher losses due to fraud. The largest change between the two models is that Interest in
Transactions is now highly significant, suggesting the practice of investment advisors trading directly with clients is associated with the most severe frauds.
Predicting Types of Fraud
There are many different types of fraud ranging from direct theft to misrepresenting past returns to attract new clients. There are also differences in who commits fraud. Fraud can be firm-wide, orchestrated by the executives of the firm, or it can involve only a rogue employee. Lumping all types of frauds into a single dependent variable may reduce predictive power, as different types of fraud may be associated with different firm characteristics. In this subsection, we test the predictability of different types of fraud.
In the first column, the dependent variable equals one for firms that commit theft during the subsequent three years. Theft includes Ponzi schemes, direct theft, self dealing, and overstating asset values. In many ways, Theft is the most interesting type of fraud and the most damaging to investors. The empirical results show that Past Regulatory violations continues to have strong predictive power. Referral Fees is also highly significant, which is perhaps unsurprising, as it simply shows that fraud firms are willing to pay to receive money to steal. We also find that Theft is more likely when the firm's clients are small, and at firms whose clients are primarily agents rather than the owners of the invested funds.
Panel B shows that, at a false positive rate of 5%, we are able to correctly predict 25.5% of Thefts. This is lower than the prediction rate for all frauds, indicating that theft is relatively difficult to identify. However, this result also indicates that we are able to predict a sizeable proportion of thefts and our earlier results were not driven entirely by other types of fraud.
In column 2, the dependent variable equals one for firms that misrepresent information to attract clients. These firms tend to have a history of regulatory and legal violations, which can be interpreted in three ways. First, past regulatory and legal violations may trigger greater scrutiny, which uncovers misrepresentations. However, we do not find any relation between past violations and fraud duration, suggesting greater scrutiny does not drive this result. Second, past wrongdoing indicates internal control problems or unethical behavior, both of which predict future wrongdoing. Third, firms must report past violations of all affiliated firms, and so this variable is substantially higher for firms with many affiliations.
Financial industry affiliations may create conflicts of interest which create incentives for misrepresentation. Broker in Firm is also highly significant. Using an affiliated brokerage removes one external party who could identify untrue statements regarding the value of assets under management or trading strategies. There is also a very strong negative relation with Investment Company Act. Likely this reflects differences in regulation, as the the audit and reporting requirements for mutual funds discourage lying.
In column 3, the dependent variable equals one for firms that subsequently allow mutual fund late trading. We include mutual fund late trading as a separate category because it is quite different from the other types fraud, and perhaps unlikely to be repeated in the future.
Mutual fund late trading is highly predictable, likely because it was widespread but occurred only among a certain subsample of firms -large mutual fund management firms. Perhaps the most important finding is not the predictability of mutual fund late trading itself, but that we have reasonable predictability in the preceding columns, and thus mutual fund late trading does not drive our results.
In the last two columns, we divide fraud into firm-wide fraud versus fraud committed by a rogue employee. Firm-wide frauds are committed by high level executives, or at the very least, with the implicit acceptance of the firm. Fraud by a rogue employee victimizes firms' investment clients, but involves employees who avoid their firms' internal control systems and the firm does not knowingly benefit. While both types of fraud harm investors there are important differences. Fraud by a rogue employee is usually less costly, and often the firm has sufficient assets to repay investors' losses. In contrast, firm-wide frauds are usually more serious and investors are far less likely to recover their losses. The results for Firm-Wide fraud are very similar to the results for all frauds, reported in column 5 of Table 3 . At a false positive rate of 5% we are able to predict 24.1% of all firm-wide frauds, compared to 29.7% of all frauds. Thus, while firm level fraud is more difficult to predict, our results are not driven by rogue employees.
The final column of Table 5 predicts fraud by rogue employees. Past Civil or Criminal is highly significant. This is due to the fact that there is a strong relation between rogue employee fraud and the number of employees at the investment management firm. There is also a strong relation between the number of employees and firms reporting criminal activity, as firms must report all criminal activity by their employees. Thus this relation has predictive validity, but it is largely driven by the number of employees. We are unable to estimate a coefficient for Broker in Firm, because all cases of rogue employee fraud occur at firms with an affiliated brokerage. Note that to avoid a spurious relation between fraud and Broker in Firm, throughout the paper we include only frauds directly harming investment clients and exclude brokerage frauds. Panel B shows that it is relatively easy to identify firms with rogue employee frauds.
Are Investors Compensated for Fraud Risk?
The fact that certain characteristics predict fraud does not necessarily imply that investors should avoid firms with high ex ante fraud risk. Many conflicts of interest arguably also benefit investors. For example, affiliation with a broker/dealer may reduce transaction costs or expedite trading. Monitoring is costly and presumably these costs are passed on to investors in the form of higher fees (e.g. Cassar and Gerakos (2010) find that hedge funds with stronger internal controls charge higher performance fees). It is possible that conflicts of interest, or other characteristics associated with higher fraud risk, create efficiency gains which are shared with investors through higher returns or lower fees. If this is the case, then provided there is clear disclosure and investors fully understand the tradeoffs, our results do not imply any market imperfection or need for regulatory action.
Until this point in the paper, we have examined investment advisory firms. However, to test whether investors are compensated for fraud risk through performance or fees requires fund level data. We match firms to fund level data from three databases: TASS hedge fund, CRSP mutual fund, and PSN institutional fund databases (see Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) for a description of the PSN database). For the CRSP and PSN samples we include only equity funds.
We define each firm's fraud risk as its predicted value from the probit regression in Table   3 column 5. For each of the three fund samples, we divide funds into fraud risk terciles based on the managing firms' fraud risk, and then estimate portfolio alphas. For the TASS hedge funds sample, we estimate alphas using the Fung and Hsieh (2001) seven factor model.
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For the CRSP mutual fund and PSN database funds we estimate alphas using the Carhart (1997) model. The results in Table 6 Panel A do not provide any evidence that fraud risk is 30 We are grateful to David Hsieh for providing the factors used for these regressions. These factors are available on his website: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/˜dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls. compensated through higher alphas. For hedge funds and mutual funds, high fraud risk is associated with significantly lower risk adjusted returns.
In Table 6 Panel B, we estimate the relation between fraud risk and fees using the same fund samples. There is no evidence that fraud risk is related to lower fees for mutual funds or institutional funds, although there is a weak negative relation between fraud risk and incentive fees for hedge funds. However, given that only one of four coefficients is significant at the 10% level, a Holm-Bonferonni test of joint significance fails to reject the hypothesis that there is no relation between fees and fraud risk.
Taken together, the results in Panels A and B of Table 6 suggest that investors are not compensated for fraud risk. Indeed, there is some evidence that fraud risk is associated with worse performance. This has important implications for interpreting the results in the previous section. If fraud risk were compensated, then investors could use our results to make an informed risk-reward tradeoff regarding fraud risk. However, given that we do not find compensation, the implication is very clear; investors should avoid high fraud risk firms.
Investors' Reaction to Fraud Detection
In this section, we examine how investors' react to the detection of fraud. Specifically, we test if fraud detection predicts firm death or investor outflows. Investors' reactions provide insight into two issues. First, variation in investors' reactions across fraud types provides evidence on their perceptions of different types of fraud. Second, the market penalties for fraud provide insight into the incentives for fraud.
The existing evidence on investors' reaction to operational risk events is mixed. Choi and Kahan (2007) and Houge and Wellman (2005) document that mutual fund scandals resulted in significant outflows for fund families. However, Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) find no relation between hedge fund flows and their measure of operational risk.
In Section 3, we were interested in predicting fraud and so the dependent variable was the commission of fraud. In this section, we are interested in investors' reaction to fraud, and so our key independent variable of interest is the detection of fraud.
In many cases, the discovery of fraud kills the firm through the combination of legal sanctions and client withdrawals. We define dead firms as those that cease filing Form ADV at least one year before the end of the sample.
31 Unfortunately, in addition to bankrupt and dissolved firms this definition will include acquired firms. Although we cannot separate acquisition from true firm death, there is no obvious reason to expect a spurious correlation between fraud disclosure and acquisition. While it is possible that fraud firms choose to be acquired by reputable firms as a means of reassuring investors and retaining clients, we do not view this as spurious because the fraud causes the acquisition. Table 7 Panel A shows the results of survival hazard models predicting the probability of firm death within the next year. The table reports hazard ratios, which can be interpreted as the probability of death for firms with a certain characteristic relative to other firms.
Thus hazard ratios below one indicate a reduced probability of death, while ratios above one imply a higher probability. The model controls for right censoring.
Column one shows that the detection of fraud is not significantly associated with firm death. However, in the second column the interaction of fraud detection and fraud size (measured as the value of assets stolen divided by total assets under management) is extremely significant. Firms that steal half of their clients' assets are 10.8 times more likely to cease operations than a baseline firm. The combination of results in columns one and two is very reasonable. Small frauds have little effect on firm survival, but large frauds destroy firms.
In the third column, we divide fraud detection based on the type of fraud committed. The point estimates for Theft and Misrepresentation are similar, but only Theft is statistically significant. There is a 239% increase in the probability a firm dies within one year of the detection of theft.
Investors can react to the disclosure of fraud by withdrawing their funds. To explore this, in Table 7 Panel B we regress the percentage change in assets under management on fraud detection. The regression includes firm fixed effects to remove any time invariant firm characteristics associated with flows, and year fixed effects to remove time variation in fraud detection.
The results in the first two columns show that the discovery of fraud is associated with significant client outflows, but only for large frauds. Column three shows that clients react much more strongly to theft than other forms of fraud. Disclosure of theft is associated with a reduction of almost 15% of assets under management. The final column shows that firm-wide frauds are associated with much larger client withdrawals than frauds committed by rogue employees.
Overall, the results in this section show that there are large market penalties for fraud.
Firms caught for fraud are significantly more likely to cease operations, and on average lose a sizable portion of assets under management. The results also show that the market penalty for theft and firm-wide fraud are greater than for other types of fraud.
Conclusion
Recent events have highlighted the importance of fraud risk in delegated portfolio management. While there is a vast literature providing detailed advice on the management of investment risk, there has been very little academic research exploring fraud risk. While media stories following the Madoff and Stanford frauds frequently mentioned certain firm characteristics, such as custody of client assets, as red flags that were evident before the detection of fraud, the fact is that over 3,000 investment advisory firms had custody of client assets at this time. Drawing conclusions about which factors predict fraud by examining only a few specific cases, and ignoring the prevalence of these factors in the overall population, is liable to lead to faulty inference. A broad study of the relation between firm characteristics and fraud, throughout the full sample of all investment advisors, is necessary
to truly determine what factors are red flags. In this paper we conduct such a study. We test whether required investment advisor disclosures can predict fraud, and what factors predict fraud. Our findings can be used by investors and regulators to identify firms with high ex ante fraud risk, and to inform policy debates about preventing future frauds.
In our paper, we hand collect information on all frauds from 2001 through 2009 that directly harm investment advisory clients. This fraud data is combined with a panel of Form ADV filings, which require registered investment advisors to disclose conflicts of interest as well as prior regulatory and legal violations.
The results show that past legal and regulatory violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring all significantly predict future fraud. At a 5% false positive rate, we are able to predict 29.7% of frauds occuring within the next three years. We find similar results when we predict investor losses, rather than simply the occurance of fraud, providing evidence that our results are not driven by minor cases. We find that certain types of fraud are more predictable than others. Misrepresentation and mutual fund late trading are more predictable than theft, and fraud by rogue employees is more predictable than firm-wide fraud. However, we are able to predict a sizable proportion of all types of fraud.
We test if investors are compensated for fraud risk through higher alphas or lower fees.
In three separate samples: hedge funds, equity mutual funds, and equity institutional funds, we fail to find evidence that fraud risk is compensated. Given the absence of compensating benefits, our results imply investors should avoid firms with high ex ante fraud risk. We also test how investors react to the detection of fraud by examining firm death and investor flows, and find there are significant market penalties for fraud.
Overall, our results suggest that the current disclosures required by the SEC have significant power for predicting future fraud, and provide indirect evidence on the harm caused by certain conflicts of interest. If investors avoided the 5% of firms identified as having the highest fraud risk in our sample, they could have avoided total dollar losses from fraud in excess of $5 billion. Based on the SEC's estimate of 9.01 hours to fill out Form ADV and an assumed cost of $1,000 per hour, during this same time period the direct costs of disclosure would have been at most $500 million. Thus, even ignoring the deterrent effect of Form ADV, this simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the benefits of Form ADV substantially outweigh the costs. However, because the SEC does not make historical Form ADV data available to the investing public, the ability of investors to develop and use predictive models based on Form ADV data is potentially limited, and the realized benefits of disclsoure during this time period may have been substantially lower. Hedge Fund Client 10.5% 10.5 4.7 * * * Table 3 Predicting Fraud
Panel A shows the results of pooled probit regressions predicting fraud. In columns one through five the dependent variable equals one if the firm commits fraud in the subsequent three years. In column six, the dependent variable equals one if the firm initiates a fraud in the next year. In the interest of brevity we do not report coefficients for the constant. Table 4 Predicting the Size of Fraud
The Table 5 Predicting Types of Fraud
The Table 6 Fraud Risk, Alphas, and Fees
In this table we test the relation of fraud risk with fees and alphas. We merge our Form ADV sample with the TASS hedge fund database (TASS), CRSP Mutual Fund database (CRSPMF), and PSN institutional fund database (PSN). Fraud risk is the predicted values from the regressions reported in Table 3 column five. In Panel A, for each database, we sort all funds into fraud risk terciles and estimate portfolio alphas. We use the Fung and Hsieh (1997) model for the TASS sample and the Carhart (1997) model for CRSPMF and PSN samples. High-Low is the alpha of a portfolio long high fraud risk funds and short low fraud risk funds. Panel B reports the relation between fraud risk and fees. The dependent variables for the TASS sample are the reported management and incentive fees. The dependent variable for the CRSP mutual fund sample is expense ratios. The dependent variable for the PSN sample is the reported fee percentage charged on a $50 million account. All models in Panel B include constants but these are not reported. The t-statistics, reported in square brackets, are adjusted using the method of Newey and West (1987) with six lags. The symbols * , * * , and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Proportion of Fraud Predicted for All False Positive Rates
This figure shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the probit regression results in Table 3 column five. The ROC curve shows the relation between the proportion of frauds detected and the proportion of false positives for all possible classification cutpoints. The ROC curve is generated by taking each observation's estimated fraud probability, computing the sensitivity and false positives using that point as a cutoff, and then plotting the results. 
